"The LTTE's emergence as the most dominant and effective politico-military force representing Tamil interests was due to the following factors: 

First, the character and personality of its leader V Prabhakaran who is disciplined, austere and passionately committed to the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils' liberation. Whatever he may be criticised for, it cannot be denied that the man has an inner fire and dedication and he is endowed with natural military abilities, both strategic and tactical. He has also proved that he is a keen observer of the nature of competitive and critical politics. He has proved his abilities in judging political events and his adroitness in responding to them. 

Secondly, he has created a highly disciplined, and dedicated cadres, a manifestation of which is inherent in what is called the 'cyanide cult.' Each regular member of the LTTE carries a cyanide pill and is pledged to committing suicide rather than being captured by the enemy. 

The third factor is the cult and creed of honesty in the disbursement and utilisation of resources. Despite long years spent in struggle, the LTTE cadres were known for their simple living, lack of any tendency to exploit the people and their operational preparedness. 

The fourth factor has been the LTTE's ability to upgrade its political and military capacities including technological inputs despite the constraints imposed on it by Sri Lankan forces and later by India. 

The fifth factor is a totally amoral and deadly violent approach in dealing with those the LTTE considers as enemies. 

The sixth factor is Prabhakaran's success in gathering around him senior advisers with diverse political, administrative and technological capacities, which contributed to effective training of his cadres, optimum utilisation of the military equipment which he had, and the structuring of an efficient command and control system.  (Assignment Colombo, by J N Dixit, Konarak Publishers, 1998)

Marshall R Singer, Ph. D. Professor of International and Intercultural Affairs, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs - University of Pittsburgh:

"As far as I can tell most ordinary Tamils support the Tigers, not necessarily because they like them, but because they like the Sri Lankan - or Indian - armies less. The Tigers are ruthless and authoritarian but they are not corrupt - they don't tolerate stealing, bribery or rape, things other armies are famous for. In fact they are perceived as being single minded in their defence of Tamils. They are so disciplined that when captured, they swallow cyanide capsules that they carry with them at all times, rather than risk revealing anything under torture." (Statement before US Congress Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing on Sri Lanka November 14,1995)

Lieutenant General Depinder Singh, Overall Force Commander of the Indian Peace Keeping Force:

"Numerous questions were to be asked as to why the IPKF could not capture or kill Pirabakaran; another equally wild allegation was that the IPKF had orders not to kill Pirabakaran. Apart from the impossibility of singling out an individual target for destruction or protection in such an environment, we must remember that by virtue of the fact that the LTTE had an effective junior leadership, the loss of Pirabakaran could never have resulted in the disintegration of the LTTE.. This (book) is a left handed salute to the LTTE whose deviousness cannot overshadow their incredible motivation and magnificent fighting prowess, for which the Indian armed forces will always have a healthy respect." (Lieutenant General Depinder Singh in "IPKF in Sri Lanka" published in 1992)

Lieutenant General S.C. Sardesh Pande, IPKF Divisional Commander, Jaffna:

"I have a high regard for the LTTE for its discipline, dedication, determination, motivation and technical expertise... I was left with the impression that the LTTE was the expression of popular Tamil sentiment and could not be destroyed, so long as that sentiment remained." (Lieutenant General S.C. Sardesh Pande in "Assignment Jafna", published in 1992)